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"Hyperbolic discount functions are characterized by a relatively high discount rate over 
short horizons and a relatively low discount rate over long horizons" (Laibson 1997). We 
suggest two cognitive procedures where individuals perceive future utility as decreasing 
at a decreasing rate as a function of time. Such a perception is similar to hyperbolic 
discounting. The first procedure shows that individuals hyperbolically discount marginal 
utility from money when they follow a cognitive procedure in which they believe that 
their wealth might increase or decrease in each future period under the constraint of a 
perceived small probability that wealth will decrease below its current level. The second 
procedure shows that individuals hyperbolically discount expected utility from 
consumption when they believe that they will rationalize their actions and thus alter their 
utility function over time. The difference in how perceived utility changes over the short 
and long horizon generates the hyperbolic discounting phenomenon. We find that greater 
tendencies toward rationalization and greater volatility in consumption increase the 
hyperbolic discounting phenomenon. Although hyperbolic discounting is usually 
regarded as impulsive and irrational, Azfar (1999) and this author suggest that hyperbolic 
discounting may be rational in some cases. 
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1  Introduction 
A consistent psychological finding on individual time preferences is that discount 
functions are hyperbolic, suggesting that people are impatient at present, but claim to be 
patient in the future. Phelps and Pollak (1968) introduced hyperbolic discount functions 
into economic theory in the context of consumption and savings across generations. 
Laibson (1994) utilized hyperbolic discount functions in the context of intertemporal one-
person decisions to study consumption and saving patterns
1. This paper illustrates two 
cognitive procedures that would lead people to act as if they were hyperbolic discounters. 
One procedure leads to hyperbolic discounting of money and the other leads to 
hyperbolic discounting of consumption. 
Two papers have offered explanations for hyperbolic discounting. Azfar (1999) 
showed that hyperbolic discounting could occur when agents were uncertain about their 
discount rate  or hazard rate, as well as the probability of not receiving payment. Azfar 
explains the intuition: 
The apparent discount rate at time t depends on the true discount rate and the expected 
hazard rate at t. The hazard rate at date t is the weighted average of the initial hazard 
rates, where the weights are the probability of survival till t. These weights decline more 
rapidly for higher hazard rates, and thus as t rises, the hazard rate converges to the lower 
end of the initial distribution. (p. 247) 
 
                                                                   
1 Experimental evidence was first offered by Thaler (1981), who used hypothetical questions and found that 
the discount rate declines sharply with the length of time to be waited. Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1989) 
replicated these findings for undergraduate and graduate students of economics and finance at two Israeli 
universities. Kirby and Herrnstein (1995) demonstrated the same results using both monetary and non-
monetary real rewards. Kirby (1997) showed, using real rewards, that subjects are hyperbolic discounters 
when subjects were induced to convey their true value using second bid auctions.   3
Rubinstein (2000) claims that the experimental results which hyperbolic discounting is 
based upon are better explained by a decision-making procedure that is based on 
similarity relations than by hyperbolic discounting. 
Impulsiveness might be seen as a negative and patience as a positive attribute. 
Kirby (1997) stated that "[a]fter all, behavior consistent with normative discounting 
should be our goal, even if it is not our norm" (p. 68). Kirby and Herrnstein (1995) wrote: 
"One may stably prefer a smaller benefit to a larger one that is more remote in time. But 
if preference reverses simply because of changes in one's temporal vantage point . . . then 
the violation of stationarity meets the ordinary criterion of impulsiveness" (p. 83). 
Contrary to these statements, Azfar (1999) and this author suggest that the hyperbolic 
discounting phenomenon might be rational. On the other hand, hyperbolic discounting 
may not need an explanation: People may simply be impulsive. 
Experiments in hyperbolic discounting generally ask subjects whether they prefer 
a small, earlier monetary reward to a larger, later monetary reward.  The first cognitive 
procedure presented here describes a situation where the perceived marginal utility from 
money is hyperbolic. The utility was marginal because the participants in the experiments 
were asked about their preferences over a sum of money that was marginal to their total 
wealth. The second cognitive procedure describes a situation where the perceived utility 
from a non-monetary reward — i.e., consumption of a particular good — is hyperbolic. 
 A crucial assumption for the procedure leading to hyperbolic discounting from 
money is that individuals perceive the probability that their wealth will decrease below its 
current level as relatively small. For simplicity, in the formal model we assume that 
probability to be zero. This assumption can be justified by loss-aversion and status-quo   4
bias [see Rabin (1998) and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1992) for a detailed analysis 
of these phenomena]. The individual is extremely averse to his wealth decreasing below 
its current level. He can actually make sure that his wealth will not deteriorate by insuring 
himself against a loss in wealth. Alternatively, he might tell himself that if, in the future, 
his financial situation will be close to the current level, he will work hard to try to ensure 
that it does not deteriorate further. We believe that such an assumption is reasonable 
because the individual himself is the one who assigns the probabilities to what might 
happen to his wealth. A second assumption is that the individual understands that future 
wealth can fluctuate between periods due to life's changing circumstances: for example, 
stock market fluctuations, real price fluctuations, unexpected expenditures or windfalls.   
Both assumptions imply that an individual perceives his future wealth as a 
random walk under the constraint that wealth will not fall below current level. Marginal 
utility is hyperbolically discounted when the individual perceives future added utility as 
decreasing at a decreasing rate over time. Hyperbolic marginal utility from money is 
thereby generated: In the near future, wealth can only increase, causing expected 
marginal utility from money to decrease. The probability that wealth will decrease in the 
far future causes the expected marginal utility from money to decrease by a lesser amount 
in the far than in the near future. This possible difference in the decrease of expected 
marginal utility in the far future generates hyperbolic marginal utility
2.  
The second cognitive procedure leads to hyperbolic discounting from 
consumption of some particular good. We assume that there is an optimal level of 
                                                                   
2 This procedure and the procedure that follow are alternative explanations to the one provided by Azfar 
(1999). The explanations do not conflict. When both prevail, marginal utility will be more intensely 
hyperbolic. 
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consumption; hence, excess consumption is harmful. An individual’s optimal 
consumption likewise follows a random walk. The individual knows this and 
contemplates the expected utility of future consumption from his perspective in the 
present. In the near future, an agent's utility has a positive probability to decrease but in 
the far future his utility might return to the present level. The difference in how expected 
utility decreases in the near and far future induces hyperbolic discounting. The 
assumption that consumption follows a random walk can be justified by assuming that: 
(1) Actual consumption is volatile around optimal consumption
3 and (2) If actual 
consumption does not equal optimal consumption, cognitive dissonance occurs; the 
individual then rationalizes his preferences in such a way that optimal consumption in the 
following period equals actual consumption in the present period.  
The fact that people rationalize and convince themselves that their actions are good 
is captured by Leon Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. The theory states 
that  humans have a powerful motive to  maintain cognitive consistency
4. Cognitive 
consistency is a state of mind in which one’s beliefs, attitudes, and behavior are all 
compatible with each other (Abelson et al., 1968). Cognitive dissonance theory predicts 
                                                                   
3 This volatility can arise when there are costs for being rigid. 
4 There is much evidence for the validity of the cognitive dissonance theory. According to Gilad et al. 
(1987) more than 900 studies were conducted up to 1982. Two seminal experiments are those of Festinger 
and Carlsmith (1959), who showed that when people lie in situations where dissonance is aroused, 
individuals tend to believe their own lies, and of Freedman (1965), who showed that when children are 
mildly threatened not to act in a certain manner, they produce more behavior change than when they are 
severely threatened.  The reason for this response is that a mild threat does not produce sufficient 
deterrence, causing behavior to be rationalized by a change in attitudes. An experiment that relates to 
consumption was conducted by Middlestaedt (1969), in which student volunteers were asked to rank 9 
swimsuits. When given a choice between their third- and fourth-ranked choice or between their third- and 
fifth-ranked choice, the choice between the third and the fourth choice produced more dissonance than did a 
choice between the third and fifth choice because it required rejecting a more desirable alternative (that is, 
the fourth versus the fifth choice). The choice's rejection thus demanded some cognitive explanation. 
Afterwards, all volunteers were given the choice between their second and third choices. Those in the high 
dissonance group were more apt to choose their third choice over their second. The experiment showed that   6
that under certain circumstances, people will change their attitudes to be congruent with 
their behavior. A person maintaining two conflicting cognitions will experience cognitive 
dissonance, an unpleasant state of tension akin to hunger or thirst. He will then wish to 
change one of the cognitions in such a way that both will no longer conflict. When 
attitudes regarding a behavior dictate that the behavior should be different than the 
behavior already performed, a person might suffer from cognitive dissonance and alter 
his attitudes in such a way that they will coincide with his behavior. One implication of 
cognitive dissonance for economic theory is that an agent who does not act according to 
his utility function might alter his utility function to accord with his behavior. A theory of 
endogenous formation of preferences can thus be derived from cognitive dissonance 
theory. After reviewing the endogenous preferences literature, Bowles (1998) claimed 
that:  
"Markets and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they 
also influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities. Economists have long 
assumed otherwise; the axiom of exogenous preferences is as old as liberal political 
philosophy itself…[yet] most economists have not asked how we come to want and value 
the things we do" (p. 75).  
 
In the second cognitive procedure, we assume that an individual's preferences vary over 
time because individuals may experience cognitive dissonance when their actions differ 
from their beliefs. Preferences in each period are thus derived from realizations of 
behavior in the previous period
5. Individuals know that in the future their utility function 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
consumers who experience cognitive dissonance after buying a product enhance the utility of the product 
bought.  
5 This paper follows several other economic papers incorporating the psychological phenomenon of 
cognitive dissonance into economic theory. This stream in the literature was initiated by Hirschman (1965), 
who used cognitive dissonance to describe attitude change regarding modernization. Akerlof and Dickens 
(1982) considered a formal model of the implications of cognitive dissonance on workers in hazardous 
industries. Specifically, such workers would suffer from cognitive dissonance and convince themselves that   7
might change; however, they evaluate future consumption based on current preferences. 
Peleg and Yaari (1973) noted that:  
"The whole question of preferences that change over time is, at the outset, rather 
troublesome…But changing of tastes…is a real phenomenon and we feel that it is worthy 
of examination, even at the cost of a certain amount of methodological deficiency."  
 
One might argue that if individuals understand that their tastes are changing, they 
should evaluate future utility based on future preferences. We assume this not to be true. 
A person may acknowledge the fact that in the future he might become overweight and 
rationalize his actions. But in the present, he does not enjoy the fact that he might become 
overweight in the future. This assumption is paradoxical. On the one hand, we assume 
that people are sophisticated; they are aware of a possible cognitive dissonance reaction 
which will cause a change their behavior because of a change in preferences. On the other 
hand people evaluate future utility from the perspective of the present, not according to 
future utility.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
the industry where they were working was safe. If safety equipment were to become available in the future, 
they would not purchase it. A Pareto inferior outcome would result whenever safety equipment was 
inexpensive relative to the cost of an accident. Dickens (1986) showed that increasing punishment could 
increase the crime rate. When punishment is mild, potential criminals who decided not to commit a crime 
rationalized their action by convincing themselves that there was no benefit from committing the crime. In 
the future, they would not commit a crime even when there was no punishment. When punishment is 
severe, no rationalization takes place because potential criminals have sufficient justification  — the 
punishment — for not committing the crime. Gilad et al. (1987) described a model where cognitive 
dissonance generates an information filter that blocks the flow of information when a discrepancy appears 
between new and old information. Hence, not all information reached the decision-maker. Nagler’s (1993) 
model on deceptive advertising assumed that individuals find it difficult acknowledging that they were 
deceived as a result of cognitive dissonance. Firms have an incentive to deceive because individuals might 
repeat purchasing from a deceiving firm due to this response.  Rabin (1994) showed that increasing 
cognitive dissonance that arises from immoral behavior could increase that behavior. He assumed that 
conformists enjoy immoral behavior yet find it difficult to justify such behavior; hence, they suffer from 
cognitive dissonance because their immoral behavior differs from their beliefs. An increase in the level of 
cognitive dissonance causes immoral behavior to decrease but also causes the person to justify such 
behavior. Because everyone justifies such behavior, the behavior becomes more acceptable in society, 
ultimately causing individuals to increase that immoral behavior. Montgomery (1994) assumed that social 
norms require husbands to provide a minimum level of family support and that failure to do so generates 
cognitive dissonance. He showed that an increase in social norms towards greater family support might 
decrease the level of family support provided by low-income men.   8
This paper aims to elucidate the discount rate generated by the two cognitive 
procedures. Thus, we will assume that there is  no initial discount rate per se. If such a 
discount rate did exist, the overall discount rate would be a function of the real discount 
rate and the discount rate generated by the cognitive procedures. 
 
2  Hyperbolic Discounting from Monetary Rewards 
The hyperbolic discounting theory states that an individual will prefer an SER 
(smaller earlier reward) to an LLR (larger later reward) in the near future, but an LLR to 
an SER in the far future. We demonstrate this phenomenon with a three-period example 
and then with an infinite horizon model. 
 
2.1  A Three-Period Example 
Consider a three-period example where period 0 stands for the present, period 1 
for the near future, and period 2 for the far future. Assume the following preferences: In 
period 0, the individual's marginal utility from money is 10. His marginal utility 
diminishes by 1 for each $1 he gains
6. The individual perceives future wealth as 
fluctuating between periods, but not falling below current wealth. Economic fluctuations 
cause volatility in wealth. Loss aversion and status quo bias can cause aversion to 
thinking that wealth might decrease below its current level.  
                                                                   
6 It follows that if the individual gains $11, his marginal utility will be negative, which is clearly unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, we model a linear diminishing marginal utility because we wish to show that a linear 
diminishing marginal utility turns hyperbolic and to focus on this point. Also, note that the number 10 is 
arbitrary. Had we assumed an arbitrarily large amount, the individual would have to gain a large amount for 
marginal utility to become negative. 
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The individual's perception about future wealth is specified by the following 
probabilities: In the first period, he might gain $1 with probability m. If he does not gain 
$1 now, he might gain it with the same probability in the next period. However, if he 
gains $1 in the first period, in the next period he might gain a n additional $1 with 
probability  a, lose $1 with probability c, and neither gain or lose with probability b, 
where  1 ? ? ? c b a . Table 1 below describes the probabilities for enjoying various 
utilities from an additional $1 in the two subsequent time periods as perceived from 
period 0. For example, the probability that additional utility will be 9 in period 1 is m, 
and the probability that additional utility will be 8 in period 2 is  ma. The bottom row 
summarizes the individual's VNM expected utility from an additional $1. For example, 
the expected utility in period 1 is  m ? 10 . Since 
) 10 9 8 ( 11 10 10 10
2 c b a m m m m ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , expected utility from an additional $1 
diminishes over time. 
Marginal utility is hyperbolically discounted when the individual perceives future 
additional utility as decreasing at a decreasing rate as a function of time. Expected 
marginal  utility from an additional $1 in period i is defined as  i Ed . The difference 
between expected additional utility in period i -1 and period i is defined as  i ? , thus 
i i Ed Ed i ? ? ?1 ? . In order to show that the discounting is hyperbolic, we must show that 
the difference between expected additional utility in p eriod i -1 and i decreases as i 
increases, that is,  0 2 1 ? ?? ?
7. 
 
                                                                   
7 The discount rate between the short and long horizon is represented by  1 ? . It is usually referred to as ?  
in the hyperbolic discounting literature.   10 
Table 1: The columns indicate the probabilities of enjoying various utilities from an additional $1 
in each period. The bottom row indicates the expected additional utility from an additional $1 in 
each period.  
Additional 
utility from $1 
Period 0  Period 1  Period 2 
10  1  m ? 1   mc m ? ?
2 ) 1 (  
9  0  m  mb m m ? ? ) 1 (  
8  0  0  ma 
Expected 
additional 
utility from $1 
10  m ? 10  
) 10 9 8 (
11 10
2






RESULT 1 :  The expected marginal utility from money is hyperbolic when 
a c m a ? ? ? ? 1 . 
Proof: Substitute the probabilities from Table 1,  m ? 1 ?  and  ) 1 ( 2 c m a m ? ? ? ? ? . The 
expected marginal utility from money is hyperbolic when  1 2 1 ? ? ? and ?  are 
positive and  2 ? is not negative.  1 ?  is always positive.  2 ?  is not negative when 
a c m ? ? ? 1 , while  2 1 ? ? ?  is positive when  c m a ? ? .  QED 
 
The intuition behind the condition  a c m ? ? ? 1  is that a must be large enough so 
that expected additional utility will not increase in period 2 . The intuition behind 
c m a ? ?  is that  a must be small enough so that expected additional utility will not 
decrease much, causing the decrease in expected additional utility between periods 1 and 
2 to be smaller than between periods 0 and 1.   11 
In order to demonstrate the inconsistency of preferences provided by the 
experimental results on hyperbolic discounting, we need to show that an individual 
prefers an SER to an LLR in the near future, but the converse in the far future. Recall that 
Table 1 shows the probabilities for enjoying various utilities from an additional $1 as a 
result of different levels of wealth. Table 2 shows the utilities from an addition of a bit 
more than $1 ($1.10) under the same conditions as in Table 1
8. The only difference 
between the tables is that in Table 2, we increased additional utility by 0.5 for each level 
of wealth.  
 
Table 2: The columns indicate the probabilities of enjoying various utilities from an additional 




Period 0  Period 1  Period 2 
10.5  1  m ? 1   mc m ? ?
2 ) 1 (  
9.5  0  m  mb m m ? ? ) 1 (  




10.5  m ? 5 . 10  
) 5 . 10 5 . 9 5 . 8 (
11 5 . 10
2






                                                                   
8 The values of $1 for the SER and $1.10 for the LLR are arbitrary. The results depend on the utilities 
attached to these values. These utilities are subjective and can, thus, differ across individuals.    12 
RESULT 2: Inconsistency of preferences will prevail (the individual will prefer the SER 
in the near future, but the LLR in the far future) when the probability of gaining the first 
$1 is sufficiently high,  5 . 0 ? m , and the probability of losing $1 is sufficiently high, 
2 5 . 0 ? ? ? a c . 
Proof: We need to show that  1 0 ) 1 . 1 ($ ) 1 ($ Ed Ed ?  and  1 2 ) 1 ($ ) 1 . 1 ($ Ed Ed ? . Substituting 
expected additional utilities from Tables 1 and 2, the first condition holds when  5 . 0 ? m , 
and the second condition holds when  2 5 . 0 ? ? ? a c .  QED 
 
The intuition behind this result is that the p robability of gaining $1 in the first 
period (m) must be sufficiently high to decrease the expected additional utility of the 
LLR in period 1. In that case, the individual will prefer the SER in period 0 to the LLR in 
period 1, which is the near-future tradeoff. The probability of losing $1 in period 2, (c), 
must be sufficiently high so that the expected additional utility in period 2 will not be too 
small. Thus, the individual will prefer the LLR in period 2 to the SER in period 1, which 
is the far-future tradeoff. 
   13 
2.2  Infinite Horizon Case 
We now extend our example to a multi-period environment. We assume that the 
marginal utility from money in period t,  t d , decreases linearly as a function of wealth in 
period t,  t w 9. Specifically,  
t t w A d ? ?     (1) 
when A is a constant parameter. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the agent contemplates future utility from the 
perspective of period 0. Let  ) ( 0 w w pr t ?  be the probability in period 0 that  w wt ? . We 
assume that  ) ( 0 w w pr t ?  is derived by the following procedure: An individual is 
endowed with wealth in period 0. He can  win, lose, or neither win nor lose $1 in each 
period under the constraint that when  his wealth is equal to his wealth in period 0, he 
cannot lose $1; thus,  he has a lower boundary for the amount of wealth he might hold. 
The expected marginal utility in period t as seen from the perspective of period 0 is:   
) ( ) ( 0
0
0 w w pr w A d E t
w
t t ? ? ? ?
?
?
   (2) 
 
In order to demonstrate that the expected marginal utility is hyperbolic, we now turn to a 
numerical analysis and compute equation (2) for each period using a Mathematica 3 
computer program
10.   
Figure 1 depicts the individual's expected marginal utility from money 400 
periods into the future in a situation where A=15 and the probability to gain the first $1 is 
                                                                   
9 See footnote 6 for a note on linear decreasing utility from money. 
10 The computer programs are available from the author by request. 
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0.5. Whenever the individual's wealth is more than his initial wealth, he can win $1 with 
probability 0.25 or lose $1 with probability 0.25. Figure 1 shows that in such a situation, 
the expected marginal utility from money will hyperbolically decrease in time.  
 







Figure 1. Expected utility from an additional $1 as a function of time. The probability of winning 
$1 when the individual’s wealth is equal to his wealth in period 0 is m=0.5, the probability of 
winning or losing $1 when the individual’s wealth is greater than his wealth in period 0 is 
a=c=0.25, and the probability of neither winning nor losing $1 when the individual has some 
initial wealth is b=0.5. 
 
Figure 2 shows that individual's choices are inconsistent when the dynamic 
described in this section occurs. For each time period t, the curve marked LLR indicates 
expected utility from a larger sum of money to be received in period t+1, while the curve 
marked SER indicates expected utility from a smaller sum of money to be received in 
period t. The expected utility from a large reward is greater than the expected utility from 
a small reward in any specific time period
11. But when the larger sum of money is given 
                                                                   
11 The levels of additional utilities in the program are arbitrary.  
Utility 
Time   15 
later than the smaller sum, the agent prefers the SER in the near future, and the LLR in 
the far future. This result is congruent with the experimental evidence.  
 







Figure 2. Expected utility from an additional $1.00 in period t (SER) and expected utility from an 
additional $1.10 in period t+1 (LLR). The probabilities for winning or loosing $1 in each period 
are the same as in Figure 1. 
 
3  Hyperbolic Discounting from Non-Monetary Rewards 
This section describes the second procedure where an individual perceives future 
expected utility as decreasing at a decreasing rate as a function of time and displays 
inconsistency of preferences. Consider an agent who contemplates his instantaneous 
utility from consumption of product x for each future time period from the perspective of 
the present. At every period there is an optimal consumption level, 
?
t x . The utility 
function is:  
t t t t x x A x u ? ? ?
? ) (      (3) 
where  t x  denotes actual consumption and the constant parameter is denoted by A.  




Utility   16 
We assume that actual consumption is volatile and distributed around optimal 
consumption. For simplicity we assume that actual consumption,  t x , is distributed 


























1        (4) 
where r+p+q=1. 
In each period, the agent chooses 
?
t x  in order to maximize (3). We endogenize 
preferences by assuming that when 
? ? t t x x , cognitive dissonance arises and the agent 
convinces himself that his actual consumption is his optimal consumption12. That is, the 
next period's utility function is: 
1 1 1 1 ) ( ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? t t t t x x A x u     (5) 
where  t t x x ?
?
?1      
 
The agent at period t understands that his preferences might alter at period t+1. In 
period t+1, the process repeats itself
13. Thus, from period t’s perspective, the probability 
that optimal consumption will diminish in period t+2 by two units is 
2 q , the probability 
                                                                   
12 Cognitive dissonance might arise because individual behavior (actual consumption) deviates from 
individual preferences (optimal consumption). Cognitive dissonance theory [Festinger, 1957] claims that in 
such a situation, the individual will experience an unpleasant physiological response and adjust one of the 
cognitions in such a way that the cognitions do not conflict. It is difficult to change what one has already 
done, so we assume that the agent will change his preferences in such a way that they will reflect behavior. 
Hence, optimal consumption follows a random walk.  
13 In the program that generates the results we assumed that 
?
t x  is large and thus the agent does not reach a 
level at which he cannot reduce consumption.   17 
that it will increase by two units is 
2 p and the probability that it will decrease by one unit 
is 2qr. The probability that it will increase by one unit is 2pr and the probability that it 
will not change is  pq r 2
2 ? . In each period, the agent can alter his utility function with 
the same probabilities. In period t, the individual knows that in the future he might 
experience cognitive dissonance, which might alter his utility function and his behavior. 
But viewed from the present, future behavior might not be optimal in terms of the present 
utility function. The utility at period t from consuming  z x  at any period  t z ?  is: 
z t z t x x A x u ? ? ?
? ) (      (6) 
 
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the agent makes his decisions at the 
beginning of period 1, when period 1's optimal consumption is known but actual 
consumption is unknown. The probability at period 1 of consuming  x in period t is 
) , ( 1 x x t
? ? . The agent begins by optimizing to consume 
?
1 x  but understands that he might 
consume much more or much less in the future because he is aware that he might 
rationalize his actions. The VNM expected utility function for consumption,  x, at period 




? ? ? ? ?
0
1 1 ) , (
x
t t x x A x x u ?     (7) 
We also assume that in each period, agents decide their optimal consumption according 
to (3) but contemplate their future expected utility according to (7). Thus, for purposes of 
understanding how individuals evaluate future utility, we must investigate  t u  as a 
function of time.   18 
 
3.1  A Three-Period Example 
In this section we demonstrate the hyperbolic discounting phenomenon in  a 
simple three-period model. Period 0 represents the present, period 1 the near future and 
period 2 the far future. Consider an individual having the utility function (7) when A=10. 
The individual consumes 
? ? ? ? 1 0 0 x x x  in period 0 and receives utility of 10. Table 3 
below shows probabilities for various utilities from consumption in the present and in the 
next two periods that are seen from the perspective of period 0. Expected utilities for the 
following two periods as seen from this perspective (i.e., period 0) are summarized in the 
table's bottom row. 
 
Table 3: The columns indicate the probabilities of having various utilities in each period. The 
bottom row indicates expected utility in each period. The variables p, q and r are probabilities; 
p+q+r=1. 
Utility   Period 0  Period 1  Period 2 
10  1  r   pq r 2
2 ?  
9  0  q p ?   ) ( 2 q p r ?  
8  0  0  2 2 q p ?  
Expected 
utility 
10  ) ( 9 10 q p r ? ?
  ) ( 8
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We define  i Eu  as expected utility at period i from the perspective of period 0. The 
discount of expected utility between periods is defined by  i i Eu Eu i ? ? ? ?1 . Thus 
q p ? ? ?1  and  pq q p 4 2 ? ? ? ? . The short-horizon discount is represented by  1 ?  while 
the long-horizon discount is represented by  2 ? . 
 
RESULT 3: In the three-period model described above, individuals perceive their future 
expected utility as hyperbolically discounted.  
Proof:  In order to show that the utility function is hyperbolic, we show that it is 
decreasing between periods ( 0 1? ?  and  0 2? ? ) at a decreasing rate ( 0 2 1 ? ? ? ? ). 
Thus, the individual discounts highly his expected utility function over the short relative 
to the long horizon.  0 1 ? ? ? ? q p  when either p or q are positive. We need to show that 
0 4 2 ? ? ? ? ? pq q p . Adding and subtracting 
2 4p  yields 
0 ) ( ) ( 4 4
2 ? ? ? ? ? q p p q p p , which holds for every  1 0 ? ? ? q p . When p and q are 
positive,  pq 4 2 1 ? ? ? ?  is positive.  QED 
 
A necessary condition for expected utility to be hyperbolic is that both p and q are 
positive. This means that if the individual rationalizes his behavior only for more or only 
for less consumption, the expected utility function will diminish at a constant rate. In 
order for the expected utility function to diminish hyperbolically, the individual must 
rationalize decisions regarding  both behaviors, that is, for more as well as for less 
consumption. 
The extent to which expected utility is hyperbolic is measured by  2 1 ? ? ? . A 
large  2 1 ? ? ? means that expected utility declines quickly in the first period relative to   20 
the second period. Any positive  2 1 ? ? ?  means that the expected utility function is 
hyperbolic when this function always decreasing over time. 
 
RESULT 4 : i)  The expected utility function is more hyperbolic when p and/or q are 
larger. ii) Subject to  . const q p ? ? , the more equal p and q are, the more hyperbolic the 
expected utility function. 
Proof:  i)  pq 4 2 1 ? ? ? ? increases in both p and q. ii) Subject to  . const q p ? ? , 
maximum 2 1 ? ? ?  is reached when  q p ? . Note that  ] ) ( [ 4 4 2 1
2 p q p p pq ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
and  ) ( 2 q p p q p ? ? ? ?  represent the size of the inequality between p and q.   
0 ) ( 2
)] ( 2 [






q p p d
p q p p d
 when  q p ? . The larger the p -q, the lower the 
2 1 ? ? ? . The same argument holds when  p q ? .    QED 
 
The intuition behind the first part of Result 4 is that an increase in p or q means 
that there is more volatility in consumption. The hyperbolic discounting results from the 
probability of deviation from optimal consumption and a probability that consumption 
will return to optimal. An increase in p or q increases both phenomena.  The intuition 
behind the second part of Result 4 is that p>q indicates a high probability to deviate 
toward greater consumption than optimal but low probability to return to optimal 
consumption. Expected utility consequently decreases faster and is less hyperbolic. 
Because the model is symmetric, the same result will arise when q>p. 
An increase in p and/or q represents an increase in volatility of consumption. But 
it can also be interpreted as an increase in the likelihood of cognitive dissonance. We   21 
assume that once actual consumption differs from optimal consumption, a reaction in the 
form of cognitive dissonance always occurs, but this is not necessarily always the case. 
Cognitive dissonance can occur with positive probability. An increase in that probability 
will increase p and q. Thus, a greater tendency toward cognitive dissonance induces an 
increase in the hyperbolic discounting phenomenon. 
Hyperbolic discounting causes dynamic inconsistency of choice in the sense that 
individuals prefer a smaller earlier reward over a larger later reward in the near future but 
the converse in the far future. Table 4 depicts a commodity that has a higher utility for the 
individual than the commodity in Table 3. 
 
Table 4: The utility in this table is higher than the utility in Table 3. The columns indicate the 
probability of having various utilities in each period. The bottom row of the table indicates 
expected utility in each period. The variables p, q and r are probabilities; p+q+r=1. 
Utility   Period 0  Period 1  Period 2 
10.5  1  r   pq r 2
2 ?  
9.5  0  q p ?   ) ( 2 q p r ?  
8.5  0  0  2 2 q p ?  
Expected 
utility 
10.5  ) ( 5 . 9 5 . 10 q p r ? ?
  ) ( 5 . 8
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RESULT 5 :  Inconsistency of preferences will prevail when  0 5 . 0 4 ? ? ? ? q p pq  and 
5 . 0 ? ? q p  for the utilities presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Proof:  The individual prefers the smaller reward in period 0 to the larger reward in 
period 1 when  ) ( 5 . 9 5 . 10 10 q p r ? ? ? , which holds when  5 . 0 ? ? q p , and prefers the 
larger reward in period 2 to the smaller reward in period 1  when 
) ( 9 10 ) ( 5 . 8 ) ( 19 21 5 . 10
2 2 2 q p r q p q p r pq r ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , which holds when 
0 5 . 0 4 ? ? ? ? q p pq . There exists p and q such that both conditions hold.   QED 
 
3.2  Infinite Horizon Case 
We now extend our example to a multi-period environment. The results are 
demonstrated using computer programs written in Mathematica 3
14. We will show the 
hyperbolic discounting phenomenon, inconsistency of preferences as well as investigate 
how a different p, q, and r influence the expected utility function (7).  
Figure 1 depicts a hyperbolic expected  utility function from the perspective of 
period 1 for 500 periods into the future. The probability that actual consumption will 
equal optimal consumption in each period is r=0.5. The probability that consumption 
level will decrease or increase by one is p=q=0.25. The computer program follows the 
model described in section 3 when the utility from consumption in the first period is set at 
A=15.  
 
                                                                   
14 The computer programs are available from the author by request. 
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Figure 3: Expected utility as a function of time. The probability that utility will not change in 
each period is equal to r=0.5. The probability that utility will increase is equal to p=0.25 and the 
probability that utility will decrease is equal to q=0.25. Utility from consumption during the first 
period equals A=15. 
 
Hyperbolic discounting causes dynamic inconsistency of choice.  Figure 4 shows 
how expected utility from two different commodities can change over time. One curve 
depicts expected utility from a larger reward at period t+1 whereas the other curve depicts 
expected utility from a smaller reward at period t. Individuals prefer the smaller, earlier 
reward over the larger, later reward in the near future and the converse in the far future.  
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Figure 4: Hyperbolic discounting causes inconsistency of preferences. In the near future, the 
individual  prefers a smaller, earlier reward at period t to a larger, later reward at period t+1 
whereas in the far future the individual prefers the larger later reward to a smaller, earlier reward. 
A=15 for the smaller, earlier reward and A=15.1 for the larger, later reward. For both rewards, 
r=0.5 and p=q=0.25. 
 
Some individuals are more prone than others to deviate from their optimal 
consumption level. A smaller r means that individuals are more prone to this deviation 
either because of greater volatility in each period's consumption or because of a greater 
tendency toward cognitive dissonance. Figure 5 depicts expected utility functions for two 
individuals, one is more prone to change his consumption, represented by r=0.1, than the 
other, represented by r=0.9. It is difficult to compare the two functions in terms of degree 
of hyperbolic discounting because the functions decrease at a different rate in all time 
periods. However, we view the individual who is more prone to changing his 
consumption as having a more hyperbolic function because his expected utility decreases 
by a relatively large amount in the first periods. 
Time 
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Figure 5: Expected utilities as a function of time when consumption volatility differs or when 
susceptibility to cognitive dissonance differs. High consumption volatility and high susceptibility 
to cognitive dissonance are represented by r=0.1 whereas low consumption volatility and low 
susceptibility to cognitive dissonance are represented by r=0.9. In both cases, p=q and p+r+q=1. 
 
Some individuals are prone to consume more than they originally planned while 
others are prone to consume less than they originally planned. Figures 6 shows the 
influence of such asymmetric behavior, which causes the expected utility function to be 
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Figure 6: Expected utilities as a function of time. The tendency to consume more than optimal 
consumption is represented by q=0.9p and the tendency to consume symmetrically around 
optimal consumption is represented by p=q. In both cases r=0.5, p+r+q=1. 
 
We find that although the rate of decrease in the expected utility function always 
decreases at a decreasing rate on average, the rate of decrease does not always decrease 
between every period. This phenomenon can be explained by an example where the 
probability that consumption will not change is r=0. During the first period, the individual 
consumes optimally. During the second period, the individual will not consume optimally 
from the perspective of the first period. He will either consume more or less than optimal. 
During the third period, his consumption will deviate once more. He will either consume 
optimally from the perspective of the first period or deviate even further from optimal 
when compared to the second period. Expected utility from consumption will equal his 
expected utility during the second period. Thus, expected utility in the third period will 
not diminish. During the fourth period, his consumption may be even further from 
q=p 
q=0.9p 
Time   27 
optimal and his expected utility will diminish even further. During odd periods, expected 
utility will not diminish. During even periods expected utility decreases at a decreasing 
rate. Figure 7 depicts such a situation.  
 
 






Figure 7: Expected utility from consumption, 8 periods into the future. The probability that utility 
will not change is r=0, p=q and p+r+q=1. 
 
The cyclical phenomenon might suggest that the three-period model in section 3.1 
does not demonstrate hyperbolic discounting because the second period is effectively a 
cycle. However, the cyclical phenomenon is salient only when r is small. The three-
period model also holds when r is not small. Whenever there are cycles, discounting will 
be hyperbolic, on average, over time.  
The cyclical phenomenon of diminishing expected utility decreases when the 
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Figure 8: Expected utility from consumption, 8 periods into the future. The probability that utility 
will remain consistent is r=0.15, p=q and p+r+q=1. 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
Hyperbolic discounting agents perceive future utility as decreasing at a decreasing 
rate as a function of time. Cognitive procedures might cause people to perceive future 
utility in the same way. We provide two such procedures. The first procedure shows that 
hyperbolic discount function for money can be derived when individuals, in each period, 
assume that their wealth might change under the constraint that the probability that their 
wealth will decrease below the current level is small. People contemplate how much 
money they are likely to have in the future and evaluate their expected marginal utility 
from money accordingly.  When marginal utility as a function of wealth is itself 
hyperbolic, utility will be hyperbolic over time if, in each period, there is a positive 
probability of gaining money. This situation does not require a positive probability of 
losing money in any period. In such circumstances, a positive probability of losing money 
and returning to previous levels of marginal utility enhances the hyperbolic discounting 
Utility 
Time   29 
phenomenon. The framework provided here shows how hyperbolic discounting can occur 
even when the marginal utility as a function of wealth is not hyperbolic.  
The second part of the paper offers a cognitive procedure that leads to hyperbolic 
discounting phenomenon with respect to consumption of a particular good. When people 
know that they will rationalize their consumption behavior in the future but evaluate 
future consumption on the basis of current standards, expected  utility function will be 
hyperbolically discounted given a unique maximum for the utility function. The 
phenomenon will be stronger when individuals are more prone to rationalizing their 
consumption, when rationalization is symmetric for more and less consumption and when 
consumption is more volatile.  
Seemingly impulsive behavior is therefore shown to be rational under set 
circumstances. Dynamic inconsistency is an outcome of the hyperbolic discounting 
phenomenon. Again, individuals are only seemingly inconsistent. They alter their future 
choices because they know that their preferences might change. We do not claim that the 
cognitive procedures presented here are the only procedures that lead to hyperbolic 
discounting; rather, we only argue that they can lead to hyperbolic discounting under the 
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